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Abstract 
This paper presents a solution concept that minimizes envy between groups 111 a bilateral 
matching market. This concept is designed to select stable matchings that are not men or women 
optimal. The idea is to compute the total number of women preferred by the men to their woman 
mates and the total number of men preferred by women to their mates in that matching. The 
absolute value of the distance between these two numbers generates the stable matchings with 
less envy between groups. An algorithm is provided to compute them. 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to find a criterion which allows us to avoid extreme matchings 
and compute intermediate ones. This paper provides a solution concept and an algorithm 
to define and compute intermediate allocations in bilateral matching markets. The solution 
concept proposed is the The Sex-Equal Matching (SEM). This concept is based on the 
minimization of the envy difference between the agents on both sides of the market. Agents 
in this model are called women and men. The set of agents and their preferences constitute 
a marriage problem. Under very weak assumptions this solution concept coincides with the 
one proposed as an open problem by Gusfield and Irving (1989) (from now on G&I ,1989). 
Theoretical work on two-sided matching markets has been traditionally focused on the 
study of extreme stable matchings (men and women optimal stable matchings). The struc-
ture of the stable matching set generates an unanimously optimal stable matching for women. 
Men consider this matching as their worse possible stable allocation. The opposite happens 
with respect to the men optimal stable matching. This is consequence of an underlining con-
flict of interest existent in this market (see Knuth ,1976, and Roth and Sotomayor ,1990,). 
Any change for one stable allocation to another will weakly improve the situation of agents 
on one side of the market at expenses of the other side. Women and men optimal stable 
matchings are unique and there are algorithms that make them easy to compute (see Gale 
and Shapley ,1962,). 
Knuth (1976) following Stan Selkow presents the first algorithm that computes match-
ings other than the extreme ones. It computes the position that each agents's partner has 
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in her/his preference list and selects the stable matching that minimizes the sum across in-
dividuals. This solution concept is utilitarian in the sense that maximize the social surplus. 
However it does not balance agents' aspirations. Intermediate matchings are a way to avoid 
the conflict of interest present in extreme ones. A proper definition of what an intermediate 
matching is shall overcome this conflict. 
An appealing concept of equity was proposed by Foley (1967) (see also Varian ,1974,). 
It is based in the combination of weak pareto optimallity and no envy. Any stable matching 
is pareto optimal. Stability is important since an unstable matching can be objected by a 
group of agents and will not be enforceable. A no envy solution is a matching where no 
agent prefers other agent's partner to his\her own mate. Yet, it is easy to find examples of 
markets where this solution concept is empty as shown by Masarany and Gokturk (1991). 
Since the conflict of interests presented in the model is among agents in each side of the 
market, it seems natural to focus on justice among groups rather than try to implement 
any individual idea of justice. This paper combines the concepts of stability and minimal 
envy between groups providing a criterion to identify and compute stable allocations that 
are intermediate. This is because no other stable matching provide less conflict of interests 
between groups. The set SEM balance agent's aspirations providing a reasonable criterion 
to avoid the conflict in the model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and defines 
some basic concepts. Section 3 defines the Sex-Equal concept and relates it with other 
intermediate solution concepts. An example illustrates the major steps to compute the 
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SEM in Section 4. Section 5 formally describes an algorithm to compute the Sex-Equal 
Matching and the paper's main results. Conclusions are collected in Section 6. 
2 The model, notation and definitions 
In a bilateral market there are two finite disjoint sets. Let us denote as W = {Wl,W2, ... Wm } 
the set of women and M = {ml' m2, ... , mn } the set of men. Each m/s preferences Pm, are 
described by a linear order on W U {mi}. Given two Wj, Wh E W, the expression WjPmiWh 
means that mi prefers to be matched to Wj rather than Wh; ~PffiiWh means that mi prefers 
to stay single rather than being matched to Who Similarly, each woman w/s preferences PWj 
are described by a linear order on M U {Wj}. The marriage problem is fully described by 
a triplet (M, W, P) where P is a preference profile containing a full description the agents' 
preferences. 
A matching is a function J-t : M U W -+ M U W, such that: 
1. (J-t(mi) tfi W -+ J-t(mi) = mi), (J-t(Wj) tfi M -+ J-t(Wj) = Wj), and 
2. (J-t(mi) = Wj) ~ (J-t(Wj) = mi)' 
It is important that no agent or group of agents should be able to improve their allocation 
in a matching by negotiation with other agents or by an individual decision. 
Definition 1 A matching J-t is blocked by an individual U E (M, W) in (M, W, P) iff 
uPqJ-t(u). A matching that can not be blocked by any individual is called individually 
mtional. 
3 
Definition 2 A matching J-l is blocked by a pair (mi' Wj) in (M, W, P) iff WjPmiJ-l(mi) 
and miPwjJ-l(Wj). 
Any individually rational matching that can not be blocked by pairs is said to be stable. 
In this model, the notion of stability is equivalent to de usual definition of the core. Let r 
denote the set of all possible stable matchings in (M, W, P). When all agents have strict 
preferences the set r has a global maximum and a global minimum according with the men 
or women's preferences. These matchings are the men optimal and women optimal stable 
matchings, denoted by J-lM and J-lw . 
Let us introduce some notation to relate each agent with his/her possible partners. For 
any mi, slL(mi) denotes the first woman Wj on Pmi such that Wj strictly prefers mi to J..L(Wj) 
(her partner in J..L); nextlL(mi) denotes the partner in J..L of the woman slL(mi)' This notation 
allows to formally define the process of changes that leads from a stable matching to another. 
Definition 3 Let p = { (mo,wo) , (ml' wd, "', (mr-l, wr-d } be an ordered list of pairs in 
a stable matching J..L such that for each i (0::; i ::; r - 1) mi+l is the nextlL(mi) , where i + 1 
is taken modulo r, i. e. mr = mo and Wr = Wo. Then p is called a rotation (exposed) in J..L; 
mi (or Wj) is in a rotation p if there is a pair (mi,Wj) in the ordered list defining p. 
Let p = { (mo,wo) , (ml' WI), .. ' ,(mr-ll Wr-l) } be a rotation exposed in J..L. Let J..L \ p 
be the matching in which each man not in p stays matched to his partner in J-l, and the 
match for each man mi in p is Wi+l = slL(mi)' The transformation of J-l to J-l \ p is called the 
elimination of p from J-l. 
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A rotation is not associated with a unique matching. It may be exposed more than once. 
In any stable matching other than p, W there is at least one rotation exposed. Moreover 
the matching p,M can be transformed to p, W through a sequence of stable matchings, by 
successively finding and eliminating any exposed rotation in each successive matching. 
Definition 4 The stable matching p, is said to be an immediate predecessor of the stable 
matching p,' if there is a rotation p such that p, \ p = p,'. 
Definition 5 A chain C = { p,\ .'" P,q } in r is an ordered set of elements of r such that 
P,i is an immediate predecessor of P,Hl for each i, 1 ::; i ::; q - 1. 
Definition 6 A maximal chain in r is a chain that extends from the minimal element to 
the maximal element of the lattice, i.e., a maximal chain is a chain from p,M to p,w. 
Definition 7 Let p = { (mo, wo) , (m}, WI), .'" (mr-l, Wr-l) } be a rotation; p moves mi down 
from Wi to WH 1, and moves Wi up from mi to mi-l . If W is either Wi or is strictly between 
Wi and WHl in Pm., then p moves mi below w. Similarly, p moves Wi above m if m is mi or 
is strictly between mi and mi-l in PWi ' 
For any man mi and for any woman Wj in (M, W, P) there is at most one rotation that 
moves mi down to Wj, and Wj up to mi' 
There are two precedence relations between the rotations: Suppose (m, w) is in a rotation 
p. (i) If p' is the (unique) rotation that moves m to w, then p' is a type 1 predecessor of 
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p. (ii) If p moves m below w, and p' =f p is the (unique) rotation that moves W above m, 
then p' is a type 2 predecessor of p . 
Type 1 precedence relation implies that if a rotation p joins a partner and another rotation 
p' separates it, p must be eliminated before p' is exposed. Type 2 precedence relation implies 
that if a pair (m, w) must be formed (by the elimination of rotation p) to avoid that another 
rotation elimination p' becomes an unstable matching, p must be eliminated before p' appears 
exposed. 
Let II(f) be the set of all the rotations in f. II(f) is ordered by the precedence relations1 
of type 1 and 2. The relation of precedence in II(f) is transitive and asymmetric. 
3 The Sex-Equal matching 
Stability and no envy are two concepts impossible to combine within the framework consid-
ered in this paper. Given the particular structure of the market seems natural to study the 
possibilities of equal treatment among groups in each side of the market rather than try to 
implement an individual idea of justice. 
Let us compute the difference between the number of envy situations in each side of the 
market. Given a pair (mi' Wj), mi envies the partners of all the women W such that WPmiWj' 
Let rmi(mi, Wj) be the position that Wj has in Pmi . The number of agents envied by mi when 
matched with Wj, is rmo(mi,Wj) -1. Respectively Wj envies rWj(Wj,mi) - 1 agents. Given 
matching IL, the difference between the total envy in each side on the market is the following: 
1 The precedence relations of type 1 and 2 are defined over rotations, not over matchings. The relation 
of immediate predecessor is defined over matchings (Definition 4). 
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(1) 
The matching with the lowest difference in envy is the one that minimizes (1): 
(2) 
The value of n - m depends on the number of agents in each side of the market. From now 
on we assume n = m 2. 
It is also important that the SEM belongs to the core of the market. Stability is 
necessary to guarantee fairness. Any unstable matching, even if it is selected by a very 
appealing concept of fairness, can be blocked by a pair of agents.. The matching resulting 
of this block can be itself blocked by other pair of agents. There are not guaranties that this 
blocking process may end in a matching that satisfying none of the properties that were the 
reason to select an unstable matching in the first place. 
Given that equal number of agents in each side and stability have been imposed the 
initial criterion coincides with the solution concept proposed by G&I (1989). 
Definition 8 A Sex-Equal Matching is a stable matching that minimizes the absolute 
value of the sum of the difference between the position that each partner has in each other 
preference list, 
(3) 
Since the number of stable allocations is finite, SEM is always non-empty. 
2 This assumption can be easily removed by adding a constant to the value of the matchings depending 
on the structure of the market. 
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Let us compare the matchings selected by the SE M with the selection by other solution 
concepts, using Knuth's example. 
Knuth's Example. (Roth and Sotomayor ,1990, page 37). Let M = { mb m2, m3, 
m4 land W = { Wl, W2, W3, W4 }. The preferences are as follows: 
Pml : Wl,W2,W3,W4,ml, PWl : m4,m3,m2,ml,wl, 
Pm2 : W2, Wll W4, W3, ffi2, PW2 : m3, m4, mb ffi2, W2, 
Pm3 : W3,W4,wb w2,m3, PW3 : m2,ml,m4,m3,W3, 
Pm4 : W4,W3,W2,Wb m4, PW4 : ml,m2,m3,m4,W4· 
There are ten stable matchings where Wl, W2, W3, W4 are matched to, respectively, 
ml m2 m3 m4 J.ll 
m2 ml m3 m4 J.l2 
ml m2 m4 m3 J.l3 
m2 ml m4 m3 J.l4 
m3 ml m4 m2 J.l5 
m2 m4 ml m3 J.l6 
m3 m4 ml m2 J.l7 
m4 m3 ml m2 J.l8 
m3 m4 m2 ml J.l9 
m4 m3 m2 ml J.110 
For each one of these stable matching v(/1) can be computed, 
V(J.ll) = -12 
V(J.l2) = v(J.l3) = -8 
V(J.l4) = -4 
v(J.lS) = V(J.l6) = 0 
v(J.l7) = 4 
v(J.l8) = V(J.l9) = 8 
v(J.llO) = 12 
(4) 
(5) 
Matchings /15 and /16 are SE M in this example. Both matchings are in the middle of the 
lattice formed by the ten matchings in this market. 
Knuth's solution concept is unable to select any particular matching among all the stable 
ones. This is because the value of the sum across individuals of the difference between 
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among agents and their mates remains the same for all matchings. This inability to select 
intermediate matchings is shared by the randomized matching mechanism in Roth and Vande 
Vate (1990). The random mechanism can not achieve every stable matching, especially those 
in the middle that have less conflict of interest (see Ma ,1996, for a proof). 
4 Computing the Set of SEM 
In this section proceeds the techniques to compute the set of SEM are introduced by an 
W6, W7, Wg } . Consider the following preferences: 
Pml : W3,WS,Wl,w7,W2,ml, 
Pm2 :WS,W2,Wg,Wl,m2, 
Pm3 : WS,W2,W3,W7,W4,m3, 
Pm4 : Wt, W4,Wg,W3,m4, 
Pm5 : Wt,W4,WS,W7,WS,mS, 
Pm6 : W3,W6,Wg,W5,mS, 
Pm7 : W7,Wg,m7, 
Pms : Wg,Wl,W3,W5,wS,W7,mg, 
PWl : m3,m2,mg,ml,m5,Wl, 
PW2 : mt, m4, m7, mg, m2, W2, 
PW3 : m4,mS,mg,m3,m},W3, 
PW4 : mS,m3,m7,mg,m4,W4, 
PW5 : m2,mS,mg,m5,m3,W5, 
PW6 : ml>mS,m7,mg,mS,WS, 
PW7 : mg,m7,W7, 
Pws: m7,mg,Wg, 
There are ten stable matchings where Wl, W2, W3, W4, W5, W6,W7, Wg are matched respec-
tively with the men denoted by the numbers in bold in the following picture: 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
In Figure 1 there are ten stable matchings where Wl to Wg are matched to, respectively, 
each one of the man represented by the numbers in bold. Above the numbers in bold is 
matching. 
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V{/1M) = -23 
v(/1a) = -14 
v{/1b) =-5 
v{/1C) =-4 
v{/1d) =-5 
V(/1e) = 5 
v(/1!) = 4 
V{/19) = 5 
v(/1h) = 14 
v{/1W) = 22 
(6) 
Matchings ttC and tt! are the ones that form the SEM. The question is how to compute 
these matchings without computing and evaluating every stable matching. There are som
e 
regularities that can be useful in this task. The difference between the value of v(tt
b) and 
the value of v(tta) is the same as the difference between v(tte ) and v(ttd ) and the same as the 
difference between v(tth ) and v(tt9 ). This difference is generate by the same rotation. There 
are five different rotations between the stable matchings in the example: 
Po = { (m1, W3), (ms, W1), (m3, ws) } 
P1 = { (m1, W1), (m2, W2) } 
P2 = {(m3,w3),(m4,w4)} 
P3 = { (ms, ws), (m6, W6) } 
P4 = { (m7, W7), (ms, ws) } 
(7) 
For instance, Po is exposed in ttM and its elimination produce tta. The changes produced 
by the elimination of Pi involves always the same partners. The value of this change is 
associated to each rotation, i.e., ai = v(tt \ Pi) - v(tt), and it is independent from the stable 
matching where the rotation is exposed. 
00 =9 
01 =9 
02 = 10 
03 = 9 
04 = 8 
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(8) 
(9) 
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The value of Cl::i is always positive. Hence if v(J.Lb) = v(J.La \ Pl), then V(J.Lb) > v(J.La). 
In order to find all the possible rotations we do not have to compute the whole set of 
stable matchingsj it is enough to compute the ones along a maximal chain (see G&I, 1989, 
Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for a proof). 
To find a rotation exposed in a stable matching is simple. The men involved in a rotation 
exposed in a stable matching will be worse once the rotation is eliminate. All women involved 
will be better off. It is enough to go down J-l(mi) in Pmi , for each mi, looking for a woman 
that prefers mi to her partner. If one woman is found, Wj) the process is repeated with 
J-l(Wj) and so on. A rotation is found when cycle is completed and the last woman found 
was initially matched with mi. This process is repeated until J-lw is reach. In J-lw there is 
not rotations exposed. 
To find all SEMis enough to go through all the maximal chains by eliminating rotations, 
until we find a change of sign between J-l and J-l \ p. Once we have found all the sign changes 
the SEM are in the matchings with the last positive or the first negative value in each chain. 
When there is no change in signs along the maximal chains it means that V(J-lM) and v(J-lW) 
have the same sign. In this case J-lM is the unique SEM if V(J-lM) 2: O,and J-lw is the unique 
SEM if v(J-lW) ::; o. 
All the information about which rotations may be eliminated at each time is contained 
in agents' preferences. All rotations can be ordered by using type 1 and type 2 precedence 
relations. In the example Po is a type 1 predecessor of PI) P2 and P3 , and that PI, P2, P3 are 
type 2 predecessors of P 4' 
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Let Oi .... j be the value of the last matching in the chain C = {pM, ... , pt } resulting 
of the elimination of rotations {Pi' ... , Pj}. With the information available, 0 can be easily 
computed: 
0 0 = pM +ao = -14 
001 = pM + ao + al = -5 
0 02 = JL M + ao + a2 = -4 
003 = pM + ao + a3 = -5 
0 012 = pM + ao + al + a2 = 5 
0 013 = pM + ao + al + a3 = 4 
0 023 = pM + ao + a2 + a3 = 5 
(10) 
On (10) all the maximal chains have changed their signs. The SEM will be found along 
them. The SE M are either the last matching with a positive value or the first one with a 
negative value. The matchings with the smallest absolute value between them are the SEM. 
(11) 
In this case we have two SEM, represented by the sequences of rotations 0 02 and 0 013 . 
After the rotations are eliminated from pM, pc and pI are obtained. 
This enumeration process becomes exponential if we compute stable allocation more 
than once. This possibility can be easily avoided. Rotations already exposed are recorded 
in O's subindex. This record can be used to avoid exponentiallity just by preventing from 
elimination each rotation numbered with a number smaller that the last rotation eliminated 
in a particular matching. For example, in 002 rotation PI can not be eliminated or in 
0 03 rotations PI and P2 are prevented from elimination. In such way no matching will be 
computed more than once. 
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5 The algorithm 
In this section an algorithm is provided that summarizes the steps followed to compute the 
SEM in the previous section. After the presentation of the SEM algorithm the section 
ends with the paper's main results. 
The SEM algorithm: 
• Step 1: Compute v(fLM). 
* If v(fLM) ;::: 0 the algorithm stops and fLM is the unique SEM. 
* If not, continue to the next step. 
• Step 2: Compute V(fLW). 
* If V(fL W) :::; 0 the algorithm stops and fL W is the unique SE M. 
* If not, continue to the next step. 
• Step 3: Determine the preorder IT(r) of rotations in the set r. 
In the previous example an intuitive way to compute IT(r) has been presented. I refer 
the reader to G&I (1989) for an efficient way to do this computations3 . 
• Step 4: Evaluate each rotation. 
• Step 5: Detect the change in signs at each maximal chain. 
3 The Irving and Guesfield algorithm is based on the construction of a directed, acyclic graph e(r), 
called the rotation digraph, whose edges correspond to a subset of pairs on TI(r). Irving and Gusfield goal 
when defining this graph is to speed the process to compute II(r), because the transitive closure of e(r) is 
II(r) and the digraph e(r) can be constructed from the preference list in a more efficient way. Gusfield and 
Irving formalized this algorithm and made this process work on O(n2 ) time. 
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• Step 6: Compute 
argmin[ InO ... kl, Int .. HII, ····Ino. .. tl, Int .. t+11 ], (12) 
• Step 7: Compute the set of SEM by eliminating the rotations on the n~, ... ,j that 
satisfies condition (12). 
Once the n~ ... ,j are selected the rotations involved can be eliminated from J-tM and the 
SEM computed. 
There is only one rotation between every pair of stable matchings J-t and J-t \ Pi and this 
rotation has always the same elements by definition. This means that the ai of each rotation 
Pi' is fixed with independence of the J-t for which Pi is exposed. 
Lemma 9 The value of ai is positive for every rotation Pi on II(f). 
Proof. In a rotation elimination only the pairs in Pi change partners. By the definition of 
rotation each elimination increase rm(m, w) and decrease rw(m, w). By definition of ai its 
value if precisely the scope of the change in the difference between rm(m, w) and rw(m, w). 
Therefore, the value of ai is positive .• 
A stable matching belongs to the SEM if v(J-t) is zero. If not, our task is to find the 
set of stable matchings that have a value nearest to zero knowing that if v(J-tM) < 0 and 
v(J-tW) > ,A, there must be a change of sign in the set of stable matchings. Clearly the 
situation where v(J-tW) < 0, and V(J-tM) > 0 is impossible by Lemma 9. 
Theorem 10 [G&J ,1989, Th. 2.2.41 Every rotation of f appears once on every maximal 
chain off. 
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Theorem 11 [Gf3I,1989, Th. 2.2.5} Every stable matching fJ.' can be generated by a se-
quence of rotation eliminations, starting from the flM stable matching, and every sequence 
leading to the same stable matching contains exactly the same rotations. 
Proposition 12 If V(fJ.M) ?:: 0 the fJ.M is the unique SEM. If v(fJ.W) S; 0 the fJ.w is the 
unique SEM. 
Proof.This result is a direct consequence of the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, 
Theorem 11 and Lemma 9. I 
The problem of finding a SEM has been reduced to the problem of finding the set of 
stable matchings for which the value of the difference between the concessions made by each 
side of the market is nearest to zero. 
Theorem 13 The SEM algorithm generates the set of Sex-Equal stable matchings. 
Proof. If V(p,M) is positive or v(p,W) is negative or any of them is cero the SEM is computed 
by the SEM algorithm in step 1 or step 2 and the proof follows from Proposition 12. 
For the proof of the remaining cases I will proceed by contradiction. Let us suppose that 
the statement of the Theorem is not true and v(fJ.M) < 0 and v(fJ. W) > O. Then there must be 
a maximal chain with a stable matching p,', where v(p,') E [ Ino: .. kl ' Int. .. HII ,····lnQ .. tl ' Int. .. HIll 
and is smaller than the ones obtained by the SEM algorithm, i.e., 
V(fJ.*) = argmin [Ino: .. kl, !nt. .. k+l!, .·.·Ino: .. tl, !ntHl!l. This is not possible because v(fJ.*) 
is a minimum of the expression 12. A contradiction. 
If p,' is not involved in the change of sign of its maximal chain, v(p,') can not be smaller 
than v(p,*) because going through a maximal chain from fJ.M to J-Lw the V(fJ.i) is always 
increasing (see proof of Lemma 9). So its absolute value must be larger than the matchings 
in the expression (12). A contradiction. I 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper presents an approach to approximate equitable allocation in matching markets. 
This approach takes into account the conflict of interest between groups intrinsic to these 
markets. The criterion proposed in the paper combines stability and envy considerations to 
propose a criterion to select fair matching within the set of stable allocations. An algorithm 
is proposed to compute the set of SEM. this algorithm intensively uses the structure of the 
set of stable allocations and works in polynomial time. 
The main short comings of this solution concept are its multiplicity and the absence of 
any structure linking the different solutions in the set. This problem makes hard to select a 
particular SEM in base to an envy criterion when the set of SEM is not a singleton. The 
problem may be avoided by using an additional criterion to select a unique stable matching 
when the set of SEM it is not a singleton. However any of the possible elements of the 
SEM minimizes the conflict of interest in the market as much as possible given stability. 
In that sense the SEM are the most equitable allocation that can be provide in a marriage 
problem. 
Both the concept and algorithm in this paper can be easily generalized to the more 
general college admissions problem. 
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